Defeasible rules are used in providing computable representations of legal documents and, more recently, have been suggested as a basis for explainable AI. Such applications draw attention to the scalability of implementations. The defeasible logic $DL(\partial_{||})$ was introduced as a more scalable alternative to $DL(\partial)$, which is better known. In this paper we consider the use of (implementations of) $DL(\partial_{||})$ as a computational aid to computing conclusions in $DL(\partial)$ and other defeasible logics, rather than as an alternative to $DL(\partial)$. We identify conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be substituted for $DL(\partial)$ with no change to the conclusions drawn, and conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be used to draw some valid conclusions, leaving the remainder to be drawn by $DL(\partial)$.

Hardware architectures can range from the use of GPUs and other hardware accelerators, through multi-core multi-threaded architectures, to shared-nothing cloud computing. Causes for failure to exploit these architectures include lack of expertise in the architectural features, lack of manpower more generally, and difficulty in updating legacy systems. Such problems can be ameliorated by mapping a logic to logic programming as an intermediate language. This is a common strategy in the implementation of defeasible logics. The first implementation of a defeasible logic, d-Prolog, was implemented as a Prolog meta-interpreter (Covington et al. 1997). Courteous Logic Programs (Grosof 1997) and its successors LPDA (Wan et al. 2009), Rulelog (Grosof and Kifer 2013), Flora2 (Kifer et al. 2018), are implemented in XSB (Swift and Warren 2012).

(Maher 2012) introduced an approach for relative expressiveness of defeasible logics, and two notions of relative expressiveness were investigated. Using the first of these definitions of relative expressiveness, we show that all the defeasible logics in the DL framework are equally expressive under this formulation of relative expressiveness. The second formulation of relative expressiveness is stronger than the first. However, we show that logics incorporating individual defeat are equally expressive as the corresponding logics with team defeat. Thus the only differences in expressiveness of logics in DL arise from differences in how ambiguity is handled. This completes the study of relative expressiveness in DL begun in \cite{Maher12}.

We present an approach to reasoning with strict and defeasible rules over literals. A controlled natural language is employed as human/machine interface to facilitate the specification of knowledge and verbalization of results. Reasoning on the rules is done by a direct semantics that addresses several issues for current approaches to argumentation-based defeasible reasoning. Techniques from formal argumentation theory are employed to justify conclusions of the approach; therefore, we not only address automated reasoning but also human acceptance of provided conclusions.

The paper proposes a fresh look at the concept of goal and advances that motivational attitudes like desire, goal and intention are just facets of the broader notion of (acceptable) outcome. We propose to encode the preferences of an agent as sequences of "alternative acceptable outcomes". We then study how the agent's beliefs and norms can be used to filter the mental attitudes out of the sequences of alternative acceptable outcomes. Finally, we formalise such intuitions in a novel Modal Defeasible Logic and we prove that the resulting formalisation is computationally feasible.

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity. The concept of permission plays an important role in many normative domains in that it may be crucial in characterising notions such as those of authorisation and derogation [11,30,33]. For example, sometimes it may happen that we mistakenly drive to a building site, or a roadwork restricted area, with signs out saying "No admittance.

There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a priority between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts. One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is the sceptical one known as Defeasible Logic. In Defeasible Logic the tool used for conflict resolution is a preference relation between rules, that establishes the priority among them. In this paper we investigate how to modify such a preference relation in a defeasible logic theory in order to change the conclusions of the theory itself. We argue that the approach we adopt is applicable to legal reasoning where users, in general, cannot change facts or rules, but can propose their preferences about the relative strength of the rules. We provide a comprehensive study of the possible combinatorial cases and we identify and analyse the cases where the revision process is successful. After this analysis, we identify three revision/update operators and study them against the AGM postulates for belief revision operators, to discover that only a part of these postulates are satisfied by the three operators.

We provide a method of translating theories of Nute's defeasible logic into logic programs, and a corresponding translation in the opposite direction. Under certain natural restrictions, the conclusions of defeasible theories under the ambiguity propagating defeasible logic ADL correspond to those of the well-founded semantics for normal logic programs, and so it turns out that the two formalisms are closely related. Using the same translation of logic programs into defeasible theories, the semantics for the ambiguity blocking defeasible logic NDL can be seen as indirectly providing an ambiguity blocking semantics for logic programs. We also provide antimonotone operators for both ADL and NDL, each based on the Gelfond-Lifschitz (GL) operator for logic programs. For defeasible theories without defeaters or priorities on rules, the operator for ADL corresponds to the GL operator and so can be seen as partially capturing the consequences according to ADL. Similarly, the operator for NDL captures the consequences according to NDL, though in this case no restrictions on theories apply. Both operators can be used to define stable model semantics for defeasible theories.

Normal forms play an important role in computer science. Examples of areas where normal forms have proved fruitful include logic, where normal forms of formulae are used both for the proof of theoretical results and in automated theorem proving, and relational databases [7], where normal forms have been the driving force in the development of database theory and principles of good data modelling. In computer science, usually normal forms are supported by transformations, operational procedures that transform initial objects (such as programs or logical theories) to their normal form. Such transformations are important for two main reasons: 1. They support the understanding and assimilation of new concepts because they allow one to concentrate on certain forms and key features only. Thus transformations can be useful as theoretical tools.